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I. INTRODUCTION
The defense of “inequitable conduct” in patent litigation is rooted
in equity and derives, not from any legislative formulation or regulatory
construct, but instead from the principles of “unclean hands.” In
Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co.,
the United States Supreme Court dismissed a case brought by a patent
owner because the patent in suit and certain related contracts were
“perjury tainted” and “inequitable conduct impregnated Automotive’s
entire cause of action.”1 The Precision Instrument case and the only two
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1. 324 U.S. 806, 819 (1945).
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other earlier decisions2 by the Supreme Court to consider an unclean
3
hands defense, “involved overt fraud, not equivocal acts of omission.”
A.

Development of Inequitable Conduct in the Federal Circuit

Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s originally narrow focus on
fraudulent conduct, in the three decades prior to the establishment of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) in 1982, the
defense of inequitable conduct grew, but with inconsistent underlying
principles.4 However, shortly after its creation, the CAFC articulated the
test for inequitable conduct in J.P Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd. and
identified two basic criteria: (1) a threshold level of materiality of
omitted or false information; and (2) a threshold level of intent to
deceive the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), both of which must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence.5 If the thresholds of intent
and materiality are met, “the court must balance them and determine as a
matter of law whether the scales tilt to a conclusion that inequitable
conduct occurred.”6
In an era when patent litigation accelerated at a historic pace, the
defense of inequitable conduct was pled with such frequency that the
CAFC in 1988 characterized the defense as a “plague” on the patent
system.7 In order to confine this growing trend, the court clarified the
requirements for inequitable conduct in Kingsdown Medical Consultants
Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., by holding that an omission or misrepresentation
must be material to patentability and must be made with an intent to
8
deceive the Patent Office. Kingsdown also required materiality and
intent to be proven separately by “clear and convincing evidence,” and
rejected proof of intent based on even “gross negligence.”9

2. Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co.
v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944).
3. Larson Mfg. Co. of South Dakota, Inc. v. Aluminart Products Ltd., 559 F.3d 1317, 1343
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (Linn, J., concurring).
4. See Robert J. Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent
Litigation, 7 Harvard J.L. & Tech. 37, 68 (1993) (“[I]t is only a slight exaggeration to say that one
could find pre-1982 decisions going both ways (i.e., finding or not finding inequitable conduct) on
almost any set of facts.”).
5. 747 F.2d 1553, 1559-60 (Fed. Cir. 1984), overruled by Tol-O-Matic, Inc. v. Proma
Produkt-Und Marketing Gesellschaft m.b.H., 945 F.2d 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
6. Id. at 1560 (citing Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1367
(Fed. Cir. 1984)).
7. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
8. 863 F.2d 867, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
9. Id.
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Notwithstanding this attempt to tighten the requirements for
proving inequitable conduct, the Federal Circuit in the ensuing years has
not held to a consistent standard or otherwise issued decisions that
would reduce the perceived “plague.” Starting with the early decision in
10
Critikon v. Becton Dickinson and continuing with Novo Nordisk v.
11
Bio-Tech General, Ferring v. Barr Labs,12 and Aventis v. Amphastar,13
the Federal Circuit has relaxed the requirement for proving intent. In
these cases, the basis for proving an “intent to deceive” has been
extended to embrace a pure negligence standard (“should have known”)
and to impute intent solely on the basis of the materiality of the
14
Moreover, as to materiality, even though the
information involved.
PTO established a narrow materiality standard in 1992, the Federal
Circuit held in Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Machine Works that the
15
agency rule cannot “supplant” the judicially developed standard.
Because inequitable conduct serves as an “atomic bomb remedy” in
patent litigation,16 the trend towards pleading inequitable conduct in a
majority of patent cases has led judges on the Federal Circuit to call for a
reevaluation of the current standards en banc and a return to the
principles in Kingsdown, previously clarified en banc.17 It has been
noted that the recent requirement for a “credible explanation” of conduct
by the patentee
effectively shifts the burden to the patentee to prove a negative: that it
did not intend to deceive the PTO. This shift is viewed as contrary to
the basic principle that it is the ‘accused infringer’—not the patentee—
who ‘must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the material

10. Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (drawing an inference of intent based on what a person “should have known”).
11. Novo Nordisk Pharms., Inc., v. Bio-Technology General Corp., 424 F.3d 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2005).
12. Ferring B.V. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc., 437 F. 3d 1181 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
13. Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharmaceticals, Inc., 525 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
14. See Erik R. Puknys & Jared D. Schuettenhelm, Application of the Inequitable Conduct
Doctrine After Kingsdown, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 839, 870 (2008).
15. Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Machine Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
16. Aventis Pharma, 525 F.3d at 1349 (Rader, J., dissenting).
17. Larson Mfg., 559 F.3d at 1343 (Linn, J., concurring) (“But in seeming contradiction with
Kingsdown, a standard even lower than ‘gross negligence’ has propagated through our case law.
This standard permits an inference of deceptive intent when ‘(1) highly material information is
withheld; (2) the applicant knew of the information [and] … knew or should have known of the
materiality of the information; and (3) the applicant has not provided a credible explanation for the
withholding.’).
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information was withheld with the specific intent to deceive the
18
PTO.’

Even if the Federal Circuit moves toward yet another en banc
consideration of the inequitable conduct doctrine, it has been suggested
that, absent clear legislative guidance for the courts, the issues may be
best left for the administrative agency involved. Citing several U.S.
Supreme Court decisions relevant to remedies for misconduct before a
19
Federal agency, including perjury and fraud, and highlighting the
20
holding in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, Professor
John Duffy observed that the “Supreme Court unanimously emphasized
that administrative process should ‘be left within the discretion of the
agencies’, because ‘administrative agencies [are] in a better position than
federal courts or Congress to design procedural rules adapted to the
21
peculiarities of the industry and the tasks of the agency involved.’”
Professor Duffy identified the possible questions for Supreme Court
review to include:
Whether a court may use its inherent powers to hold a patent
unenforceable because of a failure to disclose information at the
administrative level: That the PTO does not require to be disclosed.
[Digital] That is “not indispensable to the granting of a patent” and
“not the basis for [the patent] or essentially material to its issue.”
[Corona Tire] Whether there are no allegations of perjury or attempts
22
to conceal perjury. [Precision Instrument]

B.

Consideration of Inequitable Conduct by the PTO

In 1977, the PTO promulgated a standard for a duty of disclosure of
“material information” to the Office as being based on a reasonable
examiner, that is, “where there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to
allow the application to issue as a patent.”23 The PTO’s commentary to
18. Id. at 1344, (quoting Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357,
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“This is in tension with the rule in Star Scientific that ‘the inference must not
only be based on sufficient evidence and be reasonable in light of that evidence, but it must also be
the single most reasonable inference able to be drawn from the evidence.’” (emphasis in original)).
19. ABF Freight System, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 510 U.S. 317 (1994); Buckman v. Plaintiffs’ Legal
Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
20. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
21. John Duffy, Hot Topics, The Coming End of Inequitable Conduct (As We Know It),
presentation at the Association of Corporate Patent Counsel (ACPC) June 2008 Meeting (June
2008).
22. Id.
23. 37 C.F.R 1.56 (1984).
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the new Rule 56 stated that this standard “codifies the existing Office
policy on fraud and inequitable conduct, which is believed consistent
with the prevailing case law in the federal courts . . . [t]he section should
have a stabilizing effect on future decisions in the Office and may afford
24
guidance to courts as well.”
With the increased volume of charges of inequitable conduct in the
courts during the early 1980’s, the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) implemented a procedure for investigating charges of
fraud in 1986.25 However, that procedure was short lived and was
abandoned in 1988 because “[t]he Office is not the best forum in which
to determine whether there was an ‘intent to mislead’ and . . . [will not]
investigate and reject original or reissue applications under 37 C.F.R. §
1.56.”26
In 1992, the Office adopted a new text for Rule 56 that abandoned
the “reasonable examiner” standard27 and defined information as being
material if “(1) It establishes, by itself or in combination with other
information, a prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim; or (2) It
refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in: (i)
Opposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by the Office, or (ii)
Asserting an argument of patentability.”28
Although the PTO established this standard to govern the scope of
submissions by applicants, the courts have not embraced this definition
as the basis for determining the materiality prong of inequitable
conduct.29 The failure to use the administrative agency test may raise
issues that merit resolution by the Supreme Court.30

24. Rules of Practice in Patent Cases, 42 Fed. Reg. 5588, 5589 (January 28, 1977); see also
Christian Mammen, Controlling the ‘Plague’: Reforming the Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1329 (2009).
25. MPEP §2004(18) (5th ed. Rev. 3, 1986).
26. Mammen, supra note 24, at 1341, quoting MPEP § 2010 (6th ed. Jan. 1995) (suggesting
that the procedure was officially abandoned in 1995); see also Harry Manbeck, The Evolution and
Issue of New Rule 56, 20 AIPLA Q.J. 136, 139-40 (1992).
27. Manbeck, supra note 26 (stating that the “reasonable examiner” standard was criticized as
being “imprecise” and the goal of the new standard was to provide “a more objective set of
guidelines”). See also Mammen, supra note 24, at 1337-38.
28. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56.
29. See Digital Control Inc. v. Charles Machine Works, 437 F.3d 1309, 1315-16 (Fed. Cir.
2006) (adopting the 1984 test in American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d
1350 (Fed. Cir. 1984), and Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1367
(Fed. Cir. 2008)).
30. See Duffy, supra note 21, at footnote 23.
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Underlying Policy Considerations

Numerous policy considerations underlie any approach to
inequitable conduct.
1. Preventing Fraud
As often observed, the inequitable conduct defense is driven by the
principle that “[t]he ‘far-reaching social and economic consequences of
a patent’ give the public a strong incentive to ensure that patents come
31
from ‘backgrounds free from fraud or other inequitable conduct.’”
Certainly, patentees should not be permitted to acquire patents or
enforce them through common law fraud, as already acknowledged by
32
the Supreme Court. The penalties for inequitable conduct serve as a
deterrent to dishonest conduct before the PTO,33 as they currently
include the risk that an entire patent, and even members of its family,
34
may be held unenforceable. However, there is an attendant risk that
applicants and their counsel will be overly conservative and will flood
the Examiner with prior art that is cumulative or marginally relevant.35
2. Ensuring Quality Patents
The full and open disclosure of information to the PTO by
applicants is essential to ensuring that the Examiner has all relevant
information available at the time of examination,36 and can enhance the
37
A concern for the quality of issued
quality of the granted patents.

31. Nicole M. Murphy, Inequitable Conduct Doctrine Reform: Is the Death Penalty for
Patents Still Appropriate?, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2274, 2285 (2010).
32. See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,
819 (1945); Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1933); Hazel-Atlas Glass
Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944).
33. Melissa Wasserman, Limiting the Inequitable Conduct Defense, 13 VA. J.L. & TECH. 7, 9
(2008).
34. Mammen, supra note 24, at 1347-48.
35. Christopher Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 24
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 770-72 (2009).
36. Wasserman, supra note 33, at 10-11; see also the AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE INCOMING ADMINISTRATION REGARDING THE
U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 6, (2009) (“The current duty to disclose material
information to the PTO under 37 CFR 1.56 should be reemphasized without creating new
requirements on applicants. The highest quality examination and the strongest patent protection
occur when the PTO has all material information at the time patentability decisions are made. The
applicant’s disclosure of known material information is critical to a high-quality examination
process.”).
37. Cotropia, supra note 35, at 748-62.
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patents comes from a broad spectrum of the public.38 However, overcompliance by applicants and their attorneys, caused by the fear of
violating the inequitable conduct doctrine, can result in reduced patent
quality.39
3. Reducing Prosecution and Litigation Costs
The courts have recognized the continuing role of inequitable
conduct as a “plague” on patent litigation, creating burdens for the
parties and the judicial system, for more than two decades.40 Moreover,
a study by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) in 2003 concluded
that the then current rate for assertion of the inequitable conduct defense
by defendants was excessive and resulted in high litigation costs and
called for the removal of subjective elements in the patent law, for
example, those related to inequitable conduct.41 It was observed that the
high cost to comply with enhanced disclosure requirements (e.g., the
previously proposed disclosure requirements in the form of Examination
Support Documents under the now withdrawn “claiming rules”) are
likely to preclude independent inventors and SME’s from protecting
their ideas.42 A report of the Federal Trade Commission based on
hearings held in the early part of the twenty-first century, observed that
the “concern that mandatory statements of relevance could give rise to
dubious allegations is well taken.”43
4. Avoiding Excessive Punishment, Particularly to Innocent
Patent Owners
In contrast to concern for the public or potential competitors of the
patentee who are disadvantaged by a patent that granted on the basis of

38. See Lisa Dolak, Inequitable Conduct: A Flawed Doctrine worth Saving, presented at panel
Inequitable Conduct: What Standard? What Evidence? (Sept. 23, 2008) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://works.bepress.com/lisa_dolak/5.
39. Cotropia, supra note 35, at 762-73.
40. Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharmaceticals, Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349-50 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting); see data published in Mammen, supra note 24, at 19-27.
41. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 121-23
(Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004).
42. Cotropia, supra note 35, at 774 (“The duties under the doctrine should not be expanded to
include a duty to search or provide relevancy statements. Such duties are likely to overload the
examiner, price inventors out of the patent system, shift the burdens of examination away from a
low cost provider, and destroy the benefits of independent review.”).
43. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY, ch.5, p.13 (2003) available at
www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovatiorpt.pdf.
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some measure of inequitable conduct, there also is concern for the
innocent or even negligent participant who makes a mistake in
submitting misleading or incorrect information to the PTO. The concern
is amplified in the case where the patent owner is a bona fide purchaser
of the patent and had no knowledge of the alleged improper conduct.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE AGENDA
Given the lack of consistency and clarity with which the doctrine of
inequitable conduct has been addressed by the courts in the past twenty
years and on the basis of the recommendations in the reports of the
National Academy of Sciences and the Federal Trade Commission, the
United States Congress has included inequitable conduct provisions in
the several Patent Reform Bills that have been introduced during the past
six Congressional sessions.44 As noted by Christian Mammen in his
recent article, the bills have provisions that fall into four broad
categories:
(1) specifying the prima facie elements of inequitable conduct,
specifically materiality and intent; (2) specifying the standard of
pleading or proof in litigation in the courts; (3) changing the range of
remedies available in the courts; and (4) providing a forum within the
PTO (rather than the courts) for adjudication of inequitable conduct
allegations.45

The manner in which each of these categories of provisions would
be implemented is discussed subsequently with reference to selected
provisions of the introduced bills and proposed alternatives, which have
been raised that had been raised.
Notably, in the 109th Congress, the Honorable Lamar Smith
introduced H.R. 2795, which included in its section 5 a significant
treatment of inequitable conduct issues, including: (1) referral of
inequitable conduct investigations to the PTO; (2) codification of the
duty of candor for applicants and attorneys; (3) establishment of civil
sanctions for inequitable conduct; (4) the provision of a “but for”
threshold before a patent can be held unenforceable; and (5) the

44. American Intellectual Property Law Association Reports, Aug. 7, 2007 (reporting that
“AIPLA was among the first to develop concrete patent reform proposals more than three years ago
in responses to Federal Trade Commission and National Academies of Sciences reports on the
patent system. Those proposals focused on . . . litigation reforms as to willful infringement and
inequitable conduct”).
45. Mammen, supra note 24, at 1378.
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application of the standard to parties adverse to a patent.46 The
corresponding Senate Bill S. 3818 simply proposed to amend current §
282 by adding unenforceability as a defense in patent litigation,
establishing a statutory basis for a court finding a patent unenforceable if
materiality and intent are proven by clear and convincing evidence,
precluding unenforceability if at least one claim is not invalid, and
provided for an exemption if there was a good faith employed.47 The
Senate Bill specifically provided that intent may not be based solely on
gross negligence or on the materiality of the information misrepresented
or not disclosed.48 The original provisions regarding inequitable
conduct in the House Bill were significantly altered during markup,
primarily by deleting significant civil penalties. Both bills refer to
intentional deception rather than relying on “knowing and willful
49
Nonetheless, despite the submission of various
deception.”
alternatives by stakeholders, neither bill was passed by the
corresponding legislative body.50
In the 110th Congress, there was no treatment of inequitable
conduct in the originally introduced House legislation (H.R. 1908),51 but
the bill as passed by the House did contain substantive provisions.52
Similarly, the Senate Bill (S. 1145) originally did not contain any
provisions for inequitable conduct,53 but the bill as passed by the
Judiciary Committee and reported to the Senate did include certain
limited provision, including a provision that defined “materiality” on the
basis of the “reasonable examiner” standard and precluded an “intent to
deceive the Office” from being based solely on gross negligence or “the

46. Patent Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 5 (2005). As originally presented, H.R.
2795 would have changed the duty of candor and unenforceability; established a PTO group to
determine inequitable conduct where there was no common law “fraud,” and take away most court
jurisdiction over inequitable conduct but permit civil penalties up to $5M for violations.
47. Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 5(c) (2006).
48. Id.
49. H.R. 2795, § 5(a); S. 3818, § 5(c)(2); AIPLA Reports, supra note 44 (AIPLA advocated
that, unlike the broader standard adopted in the drafts, unenforceability should depend on a court
finding that at least one of the asserted claims should not have issued in view of the false or
withheld information).
50. H.R. 2795, § 5, available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-2795; S.
3818, §5(c), available at http://www.govtrackus/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-3818.
51. See Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 12 (as introduced in the House,
Apr. 18, 2007).
52. Id. (as passed by the United States House of Representatives, Sept. 7, 2007).
53. See Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Congress (as introduced in the United
States Senate, Apr. 18, 2007).
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materiality of the information misrepresented or not disclosed.”54 It also
required that inequitable conduct be pled with particularity, but did not
preclude such pleading until after a first judgment of invalidity of a
claim is obtained.55 Finally, it established specific remedies that a court
56
Subsequently, additional proposed
could apply in its discretion.
amendments to the Senate draft also provided for the elimination of
inequitable conduct as a basis for invalidity or unenforceability and
57
established a reissue process to purge the effects of any misconduct.
In addition, an alternative piece of legislation introduced by Senator Kyl
(S. 3600) did address inequitable conduct and proposed shifting the issue
from civil litigation to an administrative proceeding before the PTO,
while also requiring patentees to go to the PTO: (1) to have the patent
reissued in order to remove invalid claims; (2) assess the culpability of
the applicant’s conduct; and (3) impose sanctions on any parties that
58
However, in
have engaged in inequitable or fraudulent conduct.
neither case did a bill get passed by the Senate before the 110th
59
Congress ended.
Now, in the 111th Congress, neither the original House Bill (H.R.
1260) nor the original Senate Bill (S. 515) contained any provisions
60
However, inequitable conduct
dealing with inequitable conduct.
54. Id. § 12 (as passed by S. Comm. On the Judiciary, Jan. 24, 2008); Mammen, supra note
24, at 1379 (noting that three concerns prompted inclusion of provisions providing a clear standard
of materiality, a separation of intent from materiality and the provision of discretion to a court to
select a remedy).
55. S. 1145, § 12 (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Jan. 24, 2008).
56. Id.
57. The proposal to limit inequitable conduct was accompanied by proposals to require the
filing of an Applicant Quality Submission (AQS) that would identify material information and
explain how the information is relevant to the claimed invention. S. 1145, § 11 (as reported by S.
Comm. On the Judiciary, Jan. 24, 2008, proposing that patent applicants submit a search report and
analysis to patentability); see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW, REPORT TO HOUSE DELEGATES RECOMMENDATION 107A, available at
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2009/annual/summary_of_recommendations/One_Hundred_Seve
n_A.doc.
58. Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong. § 11 (2008).
59. Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-1145; Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600,
110th Cong. § 11 (2008), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s110-3600.
60. Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009); Patent Reform Act of 2009,
S. 515, 111th Cong. (as introduced in the Senate, March 3, 2009). Interestingly, Senator Hatch’s
press release of March 3, 2009, advising of the introduction of S. 515 as a jointly sponsored bill of
Senator’s Hatch (R) and Leahy (D), acknowledging that “we cannot settle for mere codification of
current practices,” and calling for a “more objective and clearer inequitable-conduct standard [that]
will remove the uncertainty and confusion that defines current patent litigation” stated,
[I]f we are serious about enacting comprehensive patent law reform, then we must
take steps to ensure that the inequitable-conduct doctrine is applied in a manner
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remained a critical issue in the ongoing discussions of the Patent Reform
Bills H.R. 1260 and S. 515, with Senator Orren Hatch maintaining
strong support for legislation focused on inequitable conduct issues. A
separate bill (S. 610), introduced by Senator Kyl, included substantial
provisions regarding inequitable conduct, although they differ somewhat
from Senator Kyl’s proposals in S. 3600 during the 110th Congress.61 S.
610 precludes invalidity or unenforceability on the basis of misconduct
before the Office (except for criminal or antitrust violations), and gives
the PTO power to conduct investigations and levy civil sanctions for
violations.62
A “Manager’s Amendment” to S. 51563 was released to the public
on March 4, 2010 as a bill supported on both sides of the aisle and
includes provisions regarding inequitable conduct64 that are an amalgam
of the recent proposals made in the Senate. If taken up and passed by
the Senate, the inequitable conduct provisions in S. 515 still would face
review and possible modification in the House of Representatives,
particularly based on input by Judiciary Committee Chair John Conyers
(D) and Representative Lamar Smith (R). Any resulting legislation
could address one or more of the several issues relevant to inequitable
conduct reform.
A.

Defining Materiality and Intent

Motivated, at least by the constantly varying standards of intent and
materiality in the courts, there have been various proposals in Congress
to establish objective definitions of “materiality” and “intent.” Congress
consistent with its original purpose: to sanction true misconduct and to do so in a
proportional and fair manner. Inequitable-conduct reform is core to this bill, as it
dictates how patents are prosecuted years before litigation. The inequitable conduct
defense is frequently pled, rarely proven, and always drives up the cost of litigation
tremendously.
“Senators Hatch, Leahy Introduce Patent Reform Act of 2009,” available at
http://hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_id=ce28c
6f0-1b78-be3e-e028-418ea18126e5. However, the Bill reported out by the Senate Judiciary
Committee at that time had no provisions for inequitable conduct. Patent Reform Act of 2009, S.
515, 111th Congress (as reported by the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 2, 2009). The recent
Manager’s Amendment to S. 515 filled that gap. See Patent Reform Act of 2010, S. 515,
“Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute,” 111th Cong. § 10 (2010), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/legislation/upload/PatentReformAmendment.pdf.
61. Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 610, 111th Cong. § 11 (2009).
62. Id.
63. Patent Reform Act of 2010, S. 515, “Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute,” 111th
Cong.
(2010),
available
at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/legislation/upload/PatentReformAmendment.pdf.
64. See id. § 10, “Supplemental Examination.”
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has the power to and certain members in both in the House and Senate
appear to have the inclination to, statutorily define “materiality” and
“intent.”
1. Materiality
The provision governing inequitable conduct in the recent
Manager’s Amendment to S. 515 does not attempt to define
“materiality,” perhaps because it is not relevant to the protocol
65
established for “purging” most bases for inequitable conduct.
However, should such provision be added in the House, the Leahy
approach to defining “materiality” of information on the basis of a
“reasonable examiner” standard (important to a reasonable examiner in
deciding whether to allow the patent application) or the House standard
(reasonable examiner would have made a prima facie finding of
unpatentability) may have the best chance of being adopted. A more
objective standard that is based upon a patent claim actually being held
invalid on the basis of the misrepresentation or non-disclosure of that
information, as proposed in the Kyl draft of S. 3600, is less likely to be
adopted.
2. Intent
As with materiality, the Manager’s Amendment does not include
any provisions that legislatively define the “intent” factor of inequitable
conduct because intent would not be relevant to the purging protocol that
is established.66 Nonetheless, should the House attempt to modify the
Senate’s approach, the resulting provision may be based upon an intent
that can be inferred, but cannot be based solely on the gross negligence
of the patent owner or on the materiality of the information
misrepresented or not disclosed. More than likely, any circumstantial
evidence of intent would have to show a “conscious or deliberate
behavior” in not disclosing material information or submitting false
information.
B.

Specifying Standard of Proof/Pleading

The existing standard of “clear and convincing evidence” is not
addressed in the Manager’s Amendment and is likely to be preserved in

65. See id.
66. See id.
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any legislation regarding the assertion of inequitable conduct as a
67
defense under 35 U.S.C. § 282.
In contrast to the Leahy bills from the 110th Congress, which
provided that the defense or claim of inequitable conduct must be pled
with particularity as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP)
9(b), the Manager’s Amendment does not address the requirements for
pleading at all.68 When considered by the House, it is possible that
provisions could be added that restrict the time for pleading inequitable
conduct to a period after a court has found one or more claims invalid, as
previously provided in S. 3818 and H.R. 2795.69 In any event, since a
“but for” standard did not find universal support and was opposed based
on it diluting the valuable role that inequitable conduct plays in
discouraging fraud, it is not likely to be included in any final
70
legislation.
C.

Changing the Range of Remedies

H.R. 1908, as passed by the House in the 110th Congress, would
have required a court to balance the equities and impose remedies
including: (1) denying any equitable relief, limiting the remedy for
infringement to a reasonable royalty; (2) holding the claims in suit or the
claims affected by the inequitable conduct unenforceable; (3) holding
the entire patent unenforceable, and/or holding the clams of a related
patent unenforceable.71
However, even these remedies may be viewed as too harsh,
especially for an innocent bona fide purchaser. Accordingly, the
Manager’s Amendment uses the ex parte reexamination process under
35 U.S.C. § 302 et seq. as a vehicle for purging or curing any improper
72
This approach, coupled with the possibility of intervening
conduct.

67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See Patent Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 5(a) (2005); see also Patent Reform Act
of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Congress, § 5(c)(2) (2006).
70. See Letter from Harry Manbeck to Senators Leahy and Specter (Mar. 10, 2008),
http://www.patenthawk.com/blog_docs/080310_Manbeck_letter_re_inequitable_conduct.pdf
(“I
believe that the inequitable conduct doctrine should not be changed by legislation so that sanctions
for misconduct are ruled out just because the patent claims in question are found to be valid.”).
71. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 12 (as passed by the House, Sept.
7, 2007).
72. Patent Reform Act of 2010, S. 515, “Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute,” § 10;
111th
Cong.
(2010),
available
at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/legislation/upload/PatentReformAmendment.pdf. Reissue under 35 USC
§ 251 had been considered as a candidate for a purging protocol; however, reissue requires a
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rights under 35 U.S.C. § 252, appears to be preferred, although it still
has limitations that may lead to inefficiencies and inequities and does
not punish truly fraudulent behavior.
While the use of “minimum guidelines,” coupled with specified
judicial discretion, has been proposed as a preferred approach that can
consider the broad spectrum of conduct,73 it has not been adopted in the
Manager’s Amendment. It was rejected because the purging protocol
would remove most bases for the inequitable conduct defense in court or
before the International Trade Commission in a § 337 proceeding.
D.

Making the PTO the Forum for Investigation and/or Remedy

Proposals to have the PTO conduct investigations of inequitable
conduct have been met with skepticism, resulting from the financial,
cultural and resource limitations in the PTO that previously led to the
abandonment of the “fraud squad” in the late 1980’s.74 Indeed, the use
of the PTO to investigate inequitable conduct, as proposed in S. 3818,
was quickly abandoned during the 109th Congress, and it appears that
the proposals for USPTO investigations in the Kyl Bill (S. 610) were
75
removed in the compromises that led to the Manager’s Amendment.
Clearly, the Manager’s Amendment proposals to have the UPTO
review the claims of a patent through reexamination, so that the withheld
or correct information or prior art can be considered, has the most
appeal, although in not all quarters.76
III. FUTURE PROSPECTS
In legislatively addressing the “plague” of inequitable conduct
charges routinely made in patent litigation and the perceived imbalance
of extreme punishment to minor offense or honest mistake that often is
alleged, while establishing incentives for full and honest
communications with the PTO during the prosecution of patent
applications, the Congress faces a broad spectrum of solutions.
At one end of the spectrum is the status quo, with the Congress
doing nothing or, perhaps, simply legislating broad definitions of intent
(negligence) and materiality (reasonable examiner) that reflect some

showing of “error without deceptive intention,” and may have been viewed as too limited in scope
for effectively purging inequitable conduct. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1999) (discussing the reissue statute).
73. Murphy, supra note 31, at 2296-2302.
74. Manbeck, supra note 26, at 139-40.
75. See Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 610, 111th Cong. § 11 (2009).
76. Murphy, supra note 31, at 2293-96.
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recent judicial holdings. At the opposite end of the spectrum is the
simple elimination of any punishment for inequitable conduct that is
77
A protocol for purging the basis for
short of common law fraud.
inequitable conduct, coupled with the elimination of most sanctions for
inequitable conduct, appears to have the greatest support, despite a
public policy in favor of some form of sanction as a deterrent.
A.

The Manager’s Amendment

The Manager’s Amendment adds a new § 257 that provides for
supplemental examinations, at the request of a patent owner, “to
consider, reconsider or correct information believed to be relevant to the
patent.”78 If information presented in the request raises “a substantial
new question of patentability,” the Director shall order ex parte
reexamination of the patent under the existing provisions of 35 U.S.C. §
302 et seq. on “each substantial new question of patentability identified
79
A key exception is that the
during the supplemental examination.
reexamination will not be limited to patents and printed publications,
thus permitting the examination of issues based on improper small entity
80
Third parties would not be
claims and erroneous declarations.
permitted to participate, but presumably could submit additional art or
institute parallel ex parte or inter partes reexamination proceedings that
81
could be merged.
The effect of a completed reexamination, assuming that original or
amended claims remain, is that the patent “shall not be held
unenforceable under § 282 on the basis of conduct relating to
information that had not been considered, was inadequately considered,
or was incorrect in a prior examination of the patent if the information
was considered, reconsidered, or corrected during a supplemental
82
In effect, this provision would permit a
examination of the patent.”
patent owner, whether or not involved in the original conduct that
resulted submitted incomplete or erroneous information before the
USPTO, to purge the basis for a claim of inequitable conduct. In fact, it

77. See Wasserman, supra note 33, at 16 (advocating a two-tier system of remedies).
78. Patent Reform Act of 2010, S. 515, 111th Cong., § 10 (2010), available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/legislation/upload/PatentReformAmendment.pdf .
79. Id.
80. Id. Another exception is that the patent owner will not have the right to file a statement
under § 304. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. The statute would expressly provide that the making of the request or the absence of
such request “shall not be relevant to enforceability of the patent under section 282.” Id.
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would preclude any defense of inequitable conduct should the purge
occur.
There are exceptions to such preclusion where allegations of
inequitable conduct are made in an answer to a complaint or in a
complaint for declaratory judgment, prior to the request for supplemental
examination.83 In addition, sanctions based on criminal or antitrust laws
are not precluded nor are investigations by the Director of the USPTO of
84
misconduct in proceedings before the USPTO.
The Manager’s Amendment did not answer issues related to the
effect of a purge where the resubmitted or newly submitted information
85
Discovery, as to these
is itself incomplete or allegedly erroneous.
issues, is certain to maintain a prominent role in the strategy for any
accused infringer. Thus, the specter of the “plague” appears to remain,
although, at a lower level. Further, the true effect of the purge protocol
as a deterrent or as an invitation to dishonesty before the USPTO would
require years to identify.
A more modest proposal that recognizes the complex factual
situations that arise would grant the courts greater leeway in fashioning
equitable relief, in such a manner that is appropriate for the proven
86
Such relief may be temporary or
degree of materiality and intent.
permanent. Also, it may reach one or more claims and one or more
patents. Other proposals for reform also would take an equitable
approach but would give greater weight to reducing over-compliance,
and would tie the legal remedy with the harm that non-disclosure does to
patent quality, thereby minimizing the remedies for failure to comply
87
with the duty of disclosure.
Whatever solution Congress fashions, the choice may not be driven
solely by the desire for higher quality patents, but also may be shaped by
broader public policies.

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See id.
86. See Murphy, supra note 31, at 2297 (advocating minimum guidelines coupled with
judicial discretion for three categories of misconduct: (1) that related to patentability and
unenforceable claims; (2) that unrelated to patentability; and (3) that demonstrating egregious intent
to deceive); see also Dolak, supra note 38, at 11.
87. Cotropia, supra note 35, at 774-75.
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